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REFRAMING GOVERNANCE: COMPETITION, FATALISM AND AUTONOMY 
IN CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Much of the work on contemporary governance points either to a strong central government  that 
continues to operate hierarchically or else to a relatively weak centre which relies on network forms 
of coordination. In place of the choice between hierarchy and networks, the cultural theory 
pioneered by Mary Douglas draws our attention to five distinctive ‘social environments’ 
characterised in terms of hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism, fatalism and autonomy. Based 
on an analysis of survey data collected from 488 local government managers across England, 
Scotland and Wales, this paper uses the Douglas framework to understand patterns of governance. 
While the data lend support to the strong centre theorists in revealing little evidence of a central-
local partnership and continuing reliance on regulatory type instruments, we find this more a recipe 
for competition and fatalism than hierarchy. Our data also point to significant differences in 
governance style both across services and between countries. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There are increasing signs of a backlash against the predominant account of contemporary 
governance which charts a shift from a hierarchical system based on authoritative decision making 
and controlled implementation to networks galvanised by voluntarism and diplomacy. 
Commentators argue variously that hierarchy never stopped being important, or indeed that it has 
become more important over time (Bang 2011; Davies 2012; 6 2015). While some rebalancing of 
scholarship away from the new governance orthodoxy is helpful, the strong versus weak centre 
debate, as Laffin (2013) describes it, highlights a more profound problem in our understanding of 
governance. The key problem here is not whether governments use hard or soft instruments to 
advance their aims – clearly they use both – but whether we can hope to understand the complexity 
of governance in the binary and in some cases zero-sum terms suggested by this debate.  
 
The cultural theory pioneered by Mary Douglas (1970; 1982; 1996) and increasingly adopted in the 
policy and political sciences (Swedlow 2011; 2014), provides us with one way of reframing our 
understanding of governance. Douglas acknowledges the central importance of authority and 
affinity in the organisation of social life but rather than envisaging these as opposite poles of a 
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continuum, she combines them as an intersection to generate five forms of organisation rather 
than two (Swedlow 2011). This arrangement has two main theoretical advantages. First it provides 
a more nuanced account of hierarchical and network forms of governance recognising, for 
example, that hierarchy – properly understood – requires a combination of both authoritative rules 
and subordinate participation. Second, in addition to the usual organisational categories, Douglas 
suggests three others – individualism, fatalism and autonomy – which promise new perspectives 
on the nature of contemporary governance.  
 
We need a better understanding of the new governance first, if we are to know who we should 
hold to account. A hierarchical style of governance implies a very different set of accountability 
arrangements to a network form. Second, we need to be clear about how the new governance 
works if we are going to evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency. The rise of the new governance 
is attributable, in large measure, to a prospectus which claims an efficiency advantage over 
traditional bureaucratic structures. While it seems unlikely that there is, or could be, a simple 
answer to efficiency and effectiveness questions of this sort (although see Hood and Dixon 2015), 
the starting point for any systematic inquiry must be to understand the terrain as it currently lies.  
 
Based on an analysis of survey data collected from 488 local government managers at the turn of  
2012/13 across England, Scotland and Wales, this paper uses insights from Douglas’s work to 
describe and better understand the relationships between central and local government. To that 
end we ask four questions. First, does the central-local relationship, as perceived by managers, look 
more like a hierarchy or a partnership? Second, to the extent that this is not the case, do the new 
categories suggested by Douglas – fatalism, individualism and autonomy – provide a better 
characterisation? Third, to what extent can variations in governance style be attributed to a country 
effect in which (for example) Scotland is governed rather differently to England? Or finally, does 
governance style vary across service areas such that managers in social care, for example, have a 
different relationship with their government to managers in sport, or other non-statutory 
functions? 
 
The paper is organised into four parts. First, against the backdrop of the traditional models of 
contemporary governance we use cultural theory to identify five accounts of the relationship 
between central and local government. Second, we describe our survey of local government 
managers and make the case for an analysis pitched at both service and country level. Third, we 
present the results of that survey in the form of service and country means for each of our different 
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accounts of central-local relations. Fourth and finally, we discuss our findings and explore their 
implications for research and practice. 
 
FROM TWO TO FIVE WAYS OF GOVERNING  
Commentators largely agree that decades of public sector reform – embracing marketisation, 
agencification and devolution – have led, certainly in Europe but perhaps less so in the US (Peters 
and Pierre 1998), to a more fragmented and diverse network of public service providers far 
removed from the archetypal, and perhaps apocryphal bureaucratic model of the post war period. 
Stoker (1998, p.19) describes the new structure of government as ‘fragmented with a maze of 
institutions and organizations’. Rhodes (1988, p.412) characterises the landscape in terms of 
‘disaggregation, differentiation, interdependence’. Sorensen and Torfing (2009, p.235) talk of 
‘increasingly complex, fragmented and multi-layered societies’. There is fundamental disagreement, 
however, about what these changes tell us about the way in which we are governed. Laffin (2013) 
suggests that two main accounts can be distinguished.  
 
The first – weak centre account – maintains that processes of fragmentation and hollowing out 
have disempowered central governments and forced them to resort to a new set of policy tools or 
instruments (Jordan et al. 2005). Rhodes (1988) describes governance as negotiated in, and defined 
by, a series of professional networks in which recognising their interdependence, different 
stakeholders voluntarily come together to negotiate a common set of priorities. He argues that the 
‘keys to effective network management’ lie in ‘facilitating, accommodating and bargaining’ (Rhodes 
1996, p.665). Fragmentation and hollowing out have, according to Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p.58) 
‘undermined the ability of the core-executive to act effectively, making it increasingly reliant on 
diplomacy’. Without ‘the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally’ the 
interactive processes of the new governance rely, according to Stoker (1998, p.22) on ‘various 
forms of partnership’ in which actors ‘exchange resources and negotiate common purposes’. 
Peters and Pierre (1998, p. 226) describe a process in which the state ‘loses the capacity for direct 
control and replaces that faculty with a capacity for influence.’  
 
In contrast, Laffin’s (2013) strong centre account, suggests that the hollowing out and 
fragmentation of service providers has served to maintain or even increase central government 
power, giving it greater control over service delivery than hitherto. Far from a government having 
to rely on the soft instruments of diplomacy, partnership and trust, the governance critics describe 
the centre as increasingly capable of exercising regulatory control. Marsh (2008, p.251) points to 
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‘the continued importance’ of hierarchy arguing indeed that it ‘remains a, perhaps the, dominant 
mode of governance’ (Marsh 2011, p.80). Taylor (1997, p.442) suggests that ‘complex networks 
may increase central control as the centre sheds costly and time consuming implementation tasks 
to concentrate on core functions of policy determination, monitoring and evaluation’. Davies 
(2002, p.316) describes the new partnerships to emerge from this landscape as little more than ‘the 
bureaucratic conduits of government policy’. Laffin et al (2014, p.772) point to the ‘persistence of 
bureaucratic and hierarchical structures’. 
 
While these two positions represent the poles of an argument which has many shades, Laffin’s 
characterisation of them serves to make two important points. The first is a tendency, in some 
quarters, to see the business of government in binary and zero sum terms. While straightforward, 
flipping between command and control, on the one hand, and networks and diplomacy on the 
other, leaves us with a rather narrow lexicon which does not do justice to the varied ways in which 
governance is negotiated. The second, related point, stems from a tendency to conflate the 
instruments of intervention and the institutional structures which result. Just because governments 
adopt a panoply of regulatory arrangements does not mean that they have constructed a hierarchy 
properly understood. While a number of scholars point to alternative modes of governance (Bell 
et al. 2010; Knill and Tosun 2009), the interdependence of hierarchies and networks (Scharpf 1994; 
Grote 2012) and the agency of formally subordinate actors (Griggs and Sullivan 2014), there is, as 
Considine and Lewis (2003, p.132) observe, ‘no agreement at all about what is really replacing, or 
should replace, the administrative theory and model that has underpinned systems of governance 
in most advanced capitalist countries for almost 200 years.’ 
 
In distinguishing between ‘social integration’ through bonds of community  and, ‘social regulation’  
through the authoritative allocation of rules (group and grid respectively) Douglas’s theory (1982, 
p.201; 6, 2014, p.4) starts on familiar ground. Low group occurs, according to Douglas (1982, 
p.201), when ‘a person finds himself the centre of a network of his own making which has no 
recognisable boundaries. He knows people, they know people, and the social horizon is entirely 
indefinite’. A situation very close to the fragmented issue networks described by Heclo (1978, 
p.102) which ‘comprise a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual 
commitment’ such that it is ‘almost impossible to say where a network leaves off and its 
environment begins.’ At the other end of the scale, high group, according to Douglas (1982, p.202), 
‘incorporates a person with the rest by implicating them together in common residence, shared 
work, shared resources and recreation’ a definition which has strong parallels, with policy 
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communities characterized by ‘stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive 
relationship . . . and insulation from other networks’ (Rhodes 1988, p.78).   
 
Similarly, Douglas’s description of grid – as ‘the cross hatch of rules’ (1982, p.192) which at its 
strongest leaves ‘minimum scope for personal choice, providing instead a set of railway lines with 
remote control of points for interaction’ (Douglas 1982, p.202) – fits with the arguments of strong 
centre theorists. ‘No other country’, as Goldsmith (2002, p.109) explains, ‘has anything like the 
plethora of initiatives, special grants, powers over taxing and spending and regional oversight as 
does Britain.’ Lower levels of grid, by contrast, create ‘a competitive individualist environment’ 
(Douglas 1982, p.203) a condition consistent with Hoggett’s (1991, p.250) diagnosis of the 
‘abandonment of control by hierarchy and its replacement with control by contract.’ The complete 
absence of grid suggests, as Swedlow (2014, p.468) puts it, a situation in which individuals (or 
organistions) ‘free from regulation’ and ‘free to act they please’ enjoy some autonomy, personal 
power or efficacy.   
 
But whereas the strong/weak centre debate asks us to choose between these different approaches 
to government, the Douglas framework combines them. Rather than ‘plumping for one or the 
other’ of these forms of organisation, Douglas (1982, p.190) explains that both grid and group are 
‘always present as possibilities’. In such a way Douglas (1982, p.190) plots group on the X axis and 
grid on the Y axis to generate five types of ‘social structure’. Drawing on the representation in 
Douglas (1982), figure 1 identifies the hierarchical form as both high grid, and high group; the 
egalitarian (or partnership) form as high group but low grid; the individualist (or competitive) form 
is low grid, low group; and the fatalist form high grid and low group. The autonomy form – located 
according to Douglas ‘off our map of social control’ (1982, p.204) – with neither the push of grid 
nor the pull of group is found at the origin of the graph. 
 
FIGURE 1  THE FIVE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF CULTURAL THEORY   
 
The Douglas 2 by 2 plus 1 arrangement promises a number of advantages. It suggests first a more 
nuanced understanding of the two established accounts of the new governance (Entwistle 2010). 
The simple application of grid through issuing and policing rules of behaviour is not according to 
Douglas a sufficient condition for true hierarchy. Rather, Douglas draws a parallel with the 
Weberian account of the bureaucratic form of management (1970, p.87; 1999, p.411) and ‘the 
monastic life or military society’ (Douglas 1970, p.87). All of these hierarchical communities 
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require so much more than the simple issuance of rules. As Douglas (1970, p.80) explains, any 
control system has to be made reasonable to those subject to it; it must ‘be justified, validated or 
legitimated as Weber put it’. Focused on exactly this issue, Du Gay (2008) describes the huge 
organisational effort required to ensure that bureaucrats are inculcated in the spirit of the office 
through technical training, salaries, pensions, promotion and so forth. Governments which make 
the mistake of thinking that their goals can be realised by authoritative decisions and precise 
prescription, but without the broader institutional traits of a bureaucracy, are according Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992, pp. 186-7), condemned to serial policy failure.  
 
The Douglas framework further suggests that the important qualities of network governance do 
not reside in structural characteristics – like network centrality or density – but rather in the cultural 
bonds of community that bind individuals into a common enterprise. If governments really want 
to govern through partnerships, they need to foster the communal bonds that Douglas describes 
as high group. Crucially though, according to Douglas, this can only be possible in the absence of 
the strong directives and status differences of high grid. In high group, she explains, the members 
of a community, or in our terms a partnership or network, ‘are not conscious of remote control’ 
(Douglas 1970, p.88). The suggestion that partnerships cannot be directed and controlled without 
turning them into hierarchies chimes with one prominent account of network effectiveness. 
Scholars focussed on the behavioural qualities of partnership type structures (Huxham and Vangen 
2004) emphasise the importance of common goals and trust while pointing to evidence that the 
voluntary negotiation of coordinated action – particularly across the still lively siloes of hierarchical 
governance – can be halting to say the least (Teisman and Klijn 2002; although 6 et al. (2006) 
provide an alternative view).   
 
Alongside refinements of our understanding of two well established accounts of governance, the 
Douglas framework draws our attention to three other organisational possibilities. Fitting into the 
bottom left hand quadrant – dubbed individualism – of low grid and low group is ‘a social context 
dominated by strongly competitive conditions’ (Douglas 1982, p.207). In the context of central 
local relations, this would mean that local governments would find themselves competing both 
amongst themselves but also with other service providers in the public, non-profit and private 
sectors. Competition might manifest itself in a number of different ways. Local governments may 
compete for access and influence over government such that policy may reflect the balance of 
power between competing interests rather as Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987, pp.43-44) put it, a 
weathervane reflects the direction of the wind. Competition for reputation – so called ‘yardstick 
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competition’ – might manifest itself in column inches in the local government press, relative 
position in performance league tables or representation in award schemes of one form or another 
(Benz 2012). Finally, local governments may compete for grants and contracts. An approach to 
government designed, according to John et al (2004, p. 406), to  ensure ‘that bidders make promises 
to improve public services in order to get ahead of their rivals.’ Although high in political salience, 
this competitive or rivalrous account of public management is surprisingly under theorised 
(although for exceptions see Considine and Lewis, 2003; Knill and Tosun 2009; and most 
importantly, Benz 2007; 2012).   
 
As we have already seen, Douglas sees the combination of high grid and low group as fostering, 
not bureaucratic compliance, but fatalist resignation. Fatalists, according to Douglas (1970, p.90), 
‘wander through a forest of regulations, imponderable forces are represented by forms to complete 
in triplicate, parking meters, inexorable laws’. ‘High levels of prescription’ but ‘minimal collective 
participation’ (Dake 1992, p. 29) will incline subjects to comply reluctantly with edicts which they 
feel little investment in. Managers will perceive themselves, as Thompson et al (1999, p.5) put it, 
‘subject to binding prescriptions . . . but excluded from membership of the solidarities that are 
responsible for making decisions’. Although an intriguing notion, the idea that a regulatory mode 
of governance without subordinate participation may foster fatalism has been used little in the 
public management literature. Hood (2000) and Stoker (2002) suggest that governments may 
deliberately foster fatalism through contrived randomness (job rotation, unannounced inspection 
and lotteries) in a bid to keep public managers on their toes.  But little has been said about the way 
in which fatalism may emerge more by accident than design (although see 6 et al 2002). Hood 
(2000) comes close to considering this position with his category of sceptical resignation, which 
sees the folly of grand ambition and unintended consequences as recurrent themes of government. 
But in this, Hood (2000) seems to see fatalism as rooted more in the human condition than the 
specific combination of high grid and low group. Others do attribute fatalism to specific 
organisational contingencies. Lipsky’s (1980, p.82) classic account of the coping mechanisms 
adopted by street level bureaucrats is explained by the fact that the job ‘is impossible to do in ideal 
terms’. There is though, little consensus on the coping mechanisms likely to emerge under fatalist 
conditions. Street level bureaucrats, or indeed managers more broadly, may react to the conflicts 
inherent in their position in a number of different ways. ‘“Why  bother?” is the rational risk 
management strategy’, according to Dake (1992, p.30), but muddling through, tossing a coin, 
copying fashionable solutions, symbolism, gaming and even sabotatage are all possible responses 
(Douglas 1996, p.94; 6 et al 2002, p.73).  
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Last, but certainly not least, Douglas’s early work recognised a fifth mode of organisation which 
is, as she puts it, ‘off our map of social control’ (Douglas 1982, p.204). Describing the autonomy 
position as that of the hermit or voluntary recluse, perhaps it is not surprising that commentators 
have found little use for this category. It is clear, however, that the idea of granting organisations 
the autonomy to perform particular functions – deliberately removing them from the distortive 
influences of grid and group – is a recurrent theme of constitutional design. Federal systems endow 
lower levels of government with the autonomy to develop distinctive solutions to the problems 
facing their area (Hooghe and Marks 2013). ‘Indeed, it is’, as Pratchett (2004, p.358) explains, 
‘almost impossible to discuss the relationship between central and local government, or the 
political context of local government more generally, without substantial reference to concepts of 
local autonomy.’ But the relevance of autonomy is not restricted to constitutional design. In rolling  
back the bureaucratic-professional structures of traditional public service delivery, the new 
governance promises to unleash a new entrepreneurialism (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Thynne 
and Wettenhall 2004). As in our other categories, we apply the autonomy idea only to the 
relationship between local and central government. We make no claim about the individual 
autonomy of particular managers nor indeed of the relationship between a particular service and 
its local stakeholders. Just as Douglas’s hermit, free from grid and group, may feel heavily 
constrained by the cave she inhabits, our service managers may enjoy considerable autonomy from 
central government but be heavily constrained by other forces.  
 
In theoretical terms the Douglas framework fits with existing accounts of governance at the same 
time as it provides new lines of inquiry. It suggests caution in the identification of hierarchical and 
network forms of governance and it directs our attention towards three other forms of 
organisation – in terms of individualism, fatalism and autonomy – which have not perhaps received 
the attention they deserve. Just as importantly, it switches our attention from the modes of 
intervention adopted by governments (expressed in terms of the kind of instruments they deploy) 
to the institutional arrangements they wittingly or unwittingly create. Whereas some scholarship 
conflates the modes and styles of governance on the assumption that the instruments of command 
will deliver control, Douglas explicitly distinguishes between modes of coordination and the 
broader institutional structures which result. Governments may draw on the rhetoric of 
partnership in some areas and put in place the instruments of command and control in others, but 
neither will guarantee the realisation of partnership or hierarchy in practice. In the next section we 
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describe our data and the way we have analysed it, before considering how well these lines of 
inquiry work in an empirical setting.    
 
METHODS 
We use the Douglas framework to understand the relationship between central and local 
government in the constituent nations of the UK. Local government provides a good case for our 
inquiry because it accounts for about a third of total public expenditure over a broad range of 
different services. Furthermore, the study of the relationship between central and local government 
provided the empirical foundation for Rhodes’ development of the governance idea (Rhodes 
1988). With their own local democractic mandate, tendencies towards ‘disaggregation, 
differentiation, interdependence’ (Rhodes 1988, p.412) should be stronger in local government 
services than in other more centralised parts of the public sector. 
 
Following the tradition of other recent studies of inter-governmental relations (McAteer and 
Bennett, 2005) we adopted an actor-centred approach focused on the perceptions of senior 
managers working in local government. The constitutional position as laid out in formal laws and 
documents may not provide a very good guide to the reality of intergovernmental relations 
(Fleurke and Willemse 2006). Senior managers, by contrast, are well placed to report on the 
perhaps informal reality of the relationship with central government because they spend all their 
professional lives at the coal face of public service delivery. We captured the views of our managers 
by sending electronic and paper surveys to the population of 2348 heads of service in 110 unitary 
authorities (56 England, 32 Scotland and 22 Wales) identified in a commercial database. The 
sample was made up of 14 heads of a range of frontline and back office functions, manual and 
white collar services, and statutory and discretionary activities in local authorities. When we closed 
the survey in February 2013, 21% of the sample had returned useable surveys (200/1149 England; 
92/567 Scotland; 196/632 Wales).  
 
The managers we surveyed were asked to respond to a series of separate statements (figure 2) on 
seven point Likert scales ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (coded 1) to ‘strongly agree’ (coded 7). 
With little earlier work to draw on, we designed statements to capture views on the five 
persepctives on central-local relations we have described. Drawing on a policy cycle approach 
(Parsons 1995), we asked managers about central government’s role in the policy process, service 
delivery, performance management and resource allocation. Assuming that the tasks associated 
with these different stages of the policy cycle can be performed in different but functionally 
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comparable ways, we asked four questions for each function designed to capture grid and group 
but also the extent to which managers enjoyed autonomy or were subject to competition in their 
relationship with government.  
 
Policy Making 
In high grid we would expect policy decisions to be made by those in elite positions such that local 
government managers will feel they have a very limited say in the policy process. In high group, 
central government will negotiate its policy with local government or its representatives believing 
itself to be dependent on local government’s expertise and delivery capacity. Agranoff (2001, p.33) 
describes an ‘ideal world of collaboration’ where ‘officials work together to develop policies and 
programs of mutual benefit.’ The competitive style of organisation suggests that the policy process 
will take the form of a competition in which different interests both from inside and outside local 
government, fight for voice in and influence on, the authoritative decisions made by the state. 
Finally, in a world of high autonomy, local government managers will feel largely unaffected by 
central government policy.  
   
Funding 
In high grid, local income and expenditure decisions will largely be determined at the centre. Local 
taxes will be tightly controlled through capping and complex rebalancing mechanisms. Resources 
will be channelled to local governments in the form of specific or earmarked grants which ‘must 
be used according to orders’ (Oulasvirta 1997, p.401). The high group account suggests that 
income and expenditure decisions will be negotiated between local and central government. Rather 
than channelling money to local authorities on the basis of negotiations or a centrally designed 
formula, competitive models of funding distribution will be characterised by a bidding process and 
a conditional, contract or reward type element which requires proof of delivery. Observing 
tendencies towards these forms of resource allocation in Germany, Benz (2007, p.429) explains 
that a ‘considerable amount of federal money is no longer allocated to regions in need but to 
regions achieving performance standards or proving to be innovative’. Finally in conditions of 
high autonomy local governments will be free to allocate resources between different services as 
they see fit. 
 
FIGURE 2  MEASURES 
 
Guiding Practice  
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In high grid, central government will devote considerable effort to controlling the delivery 
processes and practices of local authorities. Elaborate arrangements for inspection or regulation 
ensure services are delivered to ‘legally defined standards’ (Page and Goldsmith 1985, p.179). In a 
group approach, good practice will be co-produced in joint conferences and workshops in which 
central government acts as a broker, voluntarily communicating knowledge through practitioner 
and professional networks and communities. The competitive model suggests that local service 
providers compete to innovate and develop best practice. With considerable autonomy, local 
managers will be free to organise their processes and practices as they see fit. 
 
Managing Performance  
Following Hood (2012), high grid approaches to performance management require the collection 
of standardised performance information which can then be used to identify performance targets 
or floors. The high group approach suggests that performance indicators and targets are best 
negotiated between partners. Mark Friedman (2005, pp.12-13), the doyen of the network approach 
to performance management explains: ‘By using common sense measures, we can be honest with 
ourselves about whether or not we are making progress’. The competition mode suggests that 
straightforward and comparable performance information – league tables, star ratings and so forth 
– can foster user choice and intra-service rivalry. Adab et al (2002, p. 96) explain, that the advocates 
of these approaches ‘believe their publication stimulates competition, and that, as each provider 
adopts “best practice,” the quality of services will improve’. In a world of high autonomy, local 
governments will be free to manage their performance in line with local requirements. 
 
Fatalism 
With little agreement in the literature on the managerial response to fatalist conditions, we 
reasoned that fatalism could not be researched in quite the same way as our other modes of 
organisation. There is no consensus in the literature on what a fatalist perspective on policy, 
funding, practice and performance would look like. Although not clear on what fatalism means 
for management, cultural theory does provide a clear account of what the fatalist condition feels 
like.  ‘Excluded from the other ways of organizing social  life’ (Dake 1992, pp.29), Thompson, 
Ellis and Wildavsky (1990, p.224) characterise fatalism as a ‘learned (and rational) response to a 
distant, capricious, and unresponsive power imposed from without’. Accordingly, we measured 
levels of fatalist sentiment by asking two questions focused: first on the restrictions imposed by 
government and second on their coherence. We take it that respondents who answered these 
questions positively feel heavily constrained by a capricious government.  
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We analyse the data at two levels. First, following Griffith (1966), we presume that central local 
relations will vary by service area. The day to day business of British government is conducted in 
strongly delineated departments, ‘silos’ or ‘chimneys’ as officials refer to them, in which ministers 
and officials have a high degree of policy autonomy. Writing in 1966, Griffith’s survey of UK 
central government departments distinguished between regulatory, laissez-faire, and promotional 
approaches to the relationship with local government. The Home Office, according to Griffith 
was, ‘disciplinary and regulatory’ (1966, p.520), ‘concerned to see . . . that the statutory regulations 
are kept’ (1966, p.519); the old Ministry of Health had a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude to local authorities, 
‘a positive philosophy’ as Griffiths describes it ‘of as little interference as possible’ (1966, p.515); 
whereas ‘no other department supervises and assists the work of local authorities to the same 
extent’ as the ‘promotional’ Department of Education and Science (1966, pp.522-523). Although 
the names of departments have changed, we presume that the distinctiveness of different services 
remains.  
 
Second, particulary since devolution, it is possible that different countries will exhibit important 
differences in policy style (Cairney 2009; 2011). There is, as McConnell puts it, a ‘village life’ (2006, 
p.79) quality in the devolved administrations in which policy elites have close personal connections 
and similarities in outlook. Writing about Scotland after the formation of the SNP minority 
government, Arnott and Ozga (2010, p.339) detect ‘a shift in governing mode from close central 
surveillance to the setting of a direction through reference to a shared “project” that is constructed 
discursively’. Jeffery (2006, p.62) argues that: ‘Shared experience, proximity, and interdependence 
have provided strong foundations for translating some of the predevolution aspirations on 
partnership into practice’. This is in stark contrast to England, where local government’s 
representatives are, according to Laffin (2004), consistently held at arm’s length. Accordingly, with 
a presumption that devolution will make a difference, we asked respondents to consider their 
relationship with their respective government whether it be in London, Edinburgh or Cardiff.  
 
By calculating an average score for each of our 14 services in 3 countries we have a total of 42 
service means. Together with three overall country means, our data set provides an insight into 
differences of governance both between service areas and across countries. We present these data 
in two scatter plots (figures 3 and 4) where the mid-point of the scale (4) is used as the intersection 
of the x and y axes. In such a way we took scores of less than 4 (on the disagree side of the line) 
as indicative of low grid and low group. Relatively small sample sizes mean that data points 
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(particularly at the service level) which are close to 4 are perhaps better interpreted as occupying a 
neutral or grey area between agree and disagree.   
 
While our analysis is based on a large number of respondents from the whole population of service 
managers, the descriptive reliability of perceptual research is sometimes questioned particularly 
when all of the data are drawn from the same survey. Social desirability bias suggests that 
respondents may give higher ratings or a more positive assessment – particularly to things like 
partnership – which they take to be the desirable answers (Spector 2006). Response bias may 
however work the other way – through so called negative affectivity – where respondents might, 
for example, give an unduly pessimistic account of the nature of the central-local relationship 
(Spector 2006). Our respondents may, for example, have purposively exaggerated the extent to 
which they are controlled by their respective Government in a bid to increase their autonomy. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, common source bias can ‘either inflate or deflate observed 
relationships between constructs’ (Podsakoff et al 2003, p.880). As far as possible we countered 
these tendencies by framing our questions in neutral terms and sequencing them randomly through 
the survey.  
 
FINDINGS 
The service and country averages for grid and group are reported in the scatter plot in figure 3. 
While the vast majority of our data points are located on the left hand side of the chart indicating 
low group scores, managers from four Scottish services and two Welsh ones agree, on average, 
with the group statements, although both country means are in disagree territory. The English 
respondents, by contrast, are much more sceptical in their assessment of our group statements.  
All of the English services are on the disagree part of the group scale with the country average 
markedly lower than that of Scotland or Wales. The service story on the group scale is harder to 
discern. Housing and education in Scotland and Wales have amongst the highest group scores, but 
education in England has the lowest score on the chart.  
 
With the exception of a few Scottish and Welsh services – which point, albeit with some small 
numbers, to something of the negotiation and compromise that weak centre theorists suggest – 
the data contradict the suggestion that central governments work in partnership with local 
government. The central-local relationship – certainly in England and Wales – does not feel like a 
partnership for this sample of respondents. It should be said, however, that the group scale 
highlights marked differences in governance style between the three countries. Whether because 
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of their small size or a deliberate determination to do things differently, both Scotland and Wales 
have much higher group scores than England. But even in Scotland where the evidence of 
partnership is greatest, the country average is in the grey area between agree and disagree 
suggesting perhaps – as Scottish law puts it  – that the case for partnership is not proven  
 
 
FIGURE 3 GRID AND GROUP 
 
The arguments developed by strong centre theorists find more support in these data.  
Approximately half of the services we surveyed agreed  – on average – with our grid statements, 
suggesting for some services at least, governments makes policy, direct practice and allocate 
funding in relatively grid like ways. At the country level, the English and Welsh service managers 
report a significantly greater dependence on the instruments of command and control than in 
Scotland but the country averages are all drawn to the mid point of the scale by two very different 
service accounts of central local relations.  
 
Irrespective of their country, managers working in high profile and expensive services –  education 
and social care specifically – report a greater dependence on grid type instruments than their 
counterparts working in sport, democratic and back office functions. Indeed differences of 
governance style between services appear large enough to over power differences of style between 
countries. In such a way the three different country grid scores for education, child and adult social 
care are all very close. While Scottish and Welsh managers enjoy more of a partnership with their 
respective governments, the extent of grid type regulation is perceived similarly either side of the 
border. But while there is evidence of grid, only three services: education (in Scotland and Wales) 
and housing (in Wales) meet the Douglas conditions – of high grid and high group – for a genuinely 
hierarchical relationship between central and local government. According to these data, while 
governments use grid type instruments, they fail to cultivate the sense of ownership or 
participation of truly hierarchical organisation. 
 
With low group scores, these data suggest that UK central-local relations – in England, Scotland 
and Wales – are on the left hand side of the Douglas chart; a place where three interesting but 
largely undocumented things might be happening. The combination of low grid and low group  
creates, according to Douglas, conditions for individualism or competitive rivalry. The 
combination of high grid and low group – seen particularly in social care – should, according to 
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Douglas, translate into fatalism. Very low scores for both of these things – as seen in sport, 
democratic and back office services – might mean that the governance of these services may best 
be characterised in terms of their autonomy from central government. We consider these 
possibilities in reverse order. 
 
The autonomy story is relatively straight forward and consistent with expectations. The Douglas 
framework suggests that where service managers perceive themselves to be free from grid or group 
type mechanisms of control, they will enjoy a relatively autonomous position. We tested this 
hypothesis with our separate autonomy statements (appendix 1). Seven services – sport (in all three 
countries), democratic services and transport (in Scotland) and housing and back office functions 
like HR and ICT (in Wales) – had autonomy scores equal to, or greater than 4, suggesting that in 
these areas, managers perceive themselves as enjoying autonomy from their governments. As 
suggested by Douglas, services at the lowest end of our grid and group scales seem, to all intents 
and purposes, to be ‘off the map’ of central-local relations with a relationship with their respective 
government better characterised in terms of detachment or autonomy, than grid or group like 
constraint. That is not to say, of course, that service managers feel free from all disciplining forces. 
While enjoying autonomy from their respective central government, they may still feel tightly 
bound at the European or local level or even more broadly still by the financial constraints of the 
post-crash fiscal environment.  
 
Results for competition and fatalism are plotted in figure 4 with competition on the x axis and 
fatalism on the y axis. Overall – and contrary to the relationship suggested by cultural theory – the 
two sets of measures are positively correlated. At one extreme some managers report both 
competition and fatalism while others reject both descriptions. These data contradict the 
suggestion that competition between services is a default mode which emerges in low grid and 
group. Rather, we find a number of high grid services – education, regeneration, waste – agreeing 
with our competition statements whereas the low grid services (democratic services and sport) 
disagree. Governments seem to throw the kitchen sink at some services – directing them with high 
grid instruments – but also encouraging them to compete for their money, performance, influence 
and reputation. Unfortunaely, however, the more their respective central governments throw at 
them, the more inclined are managers to view their governments in fatalist terms.  
 
FIGURE 4  COMPETITION / FATALISM 
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At the country level service managers in England and Wales are considerably more inclined to a 
fatalist view of their governments than are the Scots. Both country averages are in unequivocally 
fatalist terrain in comparison to the neutral Scottish position. Perceived levels of competition, like 
grid, vary considerably between services with the highest levels reported in education and 
regeneration. Overall, the Scottish and English country averages indicate disagreement with the 
competition statements whereas the Welsh country average falls narrowly into the agree part of 
the competition scale.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on a survey of 488 service managers working in local governments across England, Scotland 
and Wales, this paper has used the Douglas framework to understand the way in which local 
managers perceive their relationship with their respective government. Taken together, the analysis 
suggests two new perspectives on the nature of contemporary governance.   
 
First, the data do not sit comfortably with the weak centre theorists who suggest that the new 
governance is characterised by interdependence, diplomacy and partnership. None of our country 
scores were consistent with these terms. Devolution does though make a difference. Perceptions 
of central-local partnership vary markedly between the three countries. Although none of the 
country averages are located within the partnership quadrant, our Scottish respondents gave 
significantly higher rating to our group statements than did their counterparts in England and 
Wales. Similarly, the Scottish respondents gave a lower rating to competition and fatalism and a 
higher score to autonomy than their counterparts in England and Wales. As suggested in parts of 
the devolution literature (McAteer and Bennett 2005; Cairney 2011), central-local relations does 
genuinely seem to be rather different north of the border.  
 
Second, perceptions of central-local relations differ between service areas. High profile and 
expensive services – like education and social care – report heavy dependence on regulatory 
instruments coexisting with conditions of competitive rivalry. Furthermore, and contrary to 
cultural theory, we find that fatalist sentiment is strongest amongst these high grid, high 
competition services. At the other end of the scale,  managers working in sport, democratic and 
back office functions – by contrast but perhaps not surprisingly – disagreed with this 
characterisation of their relationship with government. Respondents in these service areas report 
neither regulation nor competitive rivalry. Occupying, or close to, neutral territory on the fatalism 
scale, our autonomy questions seem to come closest to capturing the experience of managers in 
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these service areas. In place of the regulatory relationship described by the high priority services, 
the low profile and back office functions of local government just do not have a relationship with 
central government. They are, as Douglas might have put it, off the map of central-local control. 
 
The practical significance of these findings depends upon presumptions about the organisation of 
inter-governmental relations. A strong normative argument suggests that the autonomy of 
democratically elected local governments should be respected in a partnership type relationship 
with central government. From this perspective, evidence that governments depend more on the 
instruments of regulation and competition than partnership style negotiations, could be seen as an 
affront to local democracy, and in Wales at least, evidence of ‘regional centralism’ where the ‘newly 
established regional governments tend to grasp powers from the local governments in their 
jurisdictions’ (Laffin 2004, p.214). Others may ask, in purely instrumental terms, which mode of 
governance works best? The conventional wisdom in public management suggests that excessively 
top-down or regulatory forms of governance are doomed to implementation failure (Rhodes and 
Marsh 1992). The evidence presented in this paper indeed suggests that the harder central 
government’s push – in terms of regulation and competition – the more inclined are managers to 
perceive their actions in fatalist terms. The implications of that fatalism are not clear. Existing 
work suggests that a fatalist disposition may prompt a number of different responses from gaming 
to sabotage (6 et al 2002, p.73). If fatalist sentiment is as widespread as these data suggest, there is 
a pressing need for research into its causes and consequences.  
 
Theoretically, parts of these data sit comfortably with the Douglas framework. The intersecting 
measures of grid and group allow us to distinguish between services and countries in an insightful 
way. Although some of our data points are on the boundaries between grid and group – the ‘grey 
mish-mash’ as Thompson (2008, p.139) describes it – our questions flushed out large and 
important differences of perception both between countries and service areas. Some of the flip 
sides of grid and group also find support in these data. High grid and low group does indeed seem 
to translate into fatalism whereas, as suggested by the theory, services with the lowest grid and 
group scores agree with our autonomy statements. The data do, however, raise questions about 
the application of the Douglas framework to the analysis of inter-governmental relations. 
 
First should we measure the presence of hierarchy (together with egalitarianism, individualism and 
fatalism) or rather rely on the grid/group scales to do the job? While earlier attempts to 
operationalise cultural theory focused on the four ideal types, at least implicitly treating grid and 
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group as of theoretical but not empirical importance, we have followed more recent work in 
emphasising, and trying to measure, the presence of grid and group (for a review see Maleki and 
Hendriks 2014). Gauging the presence of hierarchy, for example, through the combination of high 
grid and high group does though present problems. While it is true that hierarchies need to give 
their members a sense of participation, work on hierarchical forms of organisation suggest that 
this is achieved in very different ways to those apparent in high group/low grid cultures. As 
Anderson and Brown (2010, p.75) explain, hierarchies motivate individuals to contribute to the 
group by offering, amongst other things, ‘high rank as a reward for self-sacrifice’. But status 
differences of this type are, of course, anathema to high group cultures. That is to say, while 
hierarchies may in theoretical terms be high group, the practical ways in which community is 
manifested and sustained in hierarchical communities may be fundamentally different to those 
apparent in high group/low grid cultures.  
 
The second issue highlighted by these data is apparent in the hybrids uncovered by asking about 
the four or five cultural forms rather than just grid and group. That local governance may best 
represented as a hybrid of high-grid and high-competition is not perhaps surprising (Rippl 2002). 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1983, p.181) explain that: ‘Market and hierarchy make a formidably stable 
combination’, but while they describe a tendency to tip from one polarised position to another, 
our respondents report a combination of both high grid and high competition. Rather than 
competitive type conditions emerging by default as low levels of grid and group take us back to an 
economic state of nature in which everyone is in it for themselves, these data suggest that rivalry 
is consciously cultivated by governments through the deployment of distinctive instruments. As 
Benz (2012, p.253) suggests ‘Besides procedures and rules of fairness’, the cultivation of inter-
governmental competition: requires a higher level of government to ‘define standards and provide 
for comparative “benchmarking” or rankings’ which pit one organisation against another. With 
only a snapshot of opinion – gathered at the dawn of the new austerity – we cannot know whether 
this apparently high grid (and often fatalist) competition points to a temporary and unstable hybrid 
position which will inevitably dissolve into some other arrangement, problems in the way we 
phrased our questions, difficulties in the theorisation of individualist environments or indeed the 
need for a third dimension of cultural theory (Maleki and Hendriks 2014). 
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FIGURE 1 THE FIVE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF CULTURAL THEORY 
 
 
 
  
 
hierarchy 
 
 
egalitarianism or partnership 
 
 
individualism or competition 
 
 
fatalism 
high group low group 
autonomy 
high 
grid 
low 
grid 
26 
 
FIGURE 2  MEASURES  
 
category Question (‘strongly disagree’ coded 1 to ‘strongly agree’ coded 7) 
Group 
 
 
1. The Government usually develops policies in partnership with my service 
2. The Government helps my service to tackle practical problems 
3. The funding which my service receives is decided through negotiation with 
the Government 
4. Performance indicators in my service reflect a balance of national and local 
priorities 
Grid 
 
 
1. The Government makes policy in my service area without proper 
consultation 
2. External inspections have a very significant impact on my service 
3. My service benefits from specific and/or ring fenced grants provided by the 
Government 
4. The Government’s performance management frameworks lead my service 
to focus on national priorities rather than local ones 
Competition 
 
 
1. My service has to compete to ensure that its voice is heard in the 
Government’s policy process 
2. The Government uses performance indicators in my service to encourage 
competition between authorities 
3. The funding that my service receives is allocated through bids we make in 
competition with other authorities 
4. The Government encourages my service to compete with others for 
recognition as an example of best practice 
Autonomy 
 
 
1. The Government has no direct policy influence on my service 
2. The Government allows my service to work out the best way to deliver 
policies at local level 
3. The Government doesn't have a major say in the allocation of funding 
between services 
4. Performance indicators in my service are determined locally 
Fatalism 
 
 
1. The government places a lot of restrictions on my service 
2. Different Government departments seem to have conflicting policies for my 
service 
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FIGURE 3 GRID AND GROUP  
 
 
  
England
democratic
edn
housing
adults
children
sport
waste
Scotland
democratic
edn
housing
back office
planning
adults
children
sport
waste
Wales
democratic
edn
housing
back office
children
sport
waste
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
5.50
2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
g
ri
d
group
England
scotland
Wales
28 
 
FIGURE 4  COMPETITION AND FATALISM  
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Appendix 1  Mean Scores  
 England 
Group 
England 
Grid 
England 
Autonomy 
England 
Comp 
England 
Fatalism 
Scotland 
Group 
Scotland 
Grid 
Scotland 
Autonomy 
Scotland 
Comp. 
Scotland 
Fatalism 
Wales 
Group 
Wales 
 Grid 
Wales 
Autonomy 
Wales 
Comp. 
Wales 
Fatalism 
country  2.78 4.15 3.32 3.81 4.94 3.92 3.83 3.70 3.45 4.01 3.53 4.4 3.54 4.03 4.82 
corporate 2.82 4.54 3.34 3.98 5.04 4.02 3.79 3.73 3.42 3.66 3.41 4.45 3.44 3.88 5.35 
democratic 2.33 3.60 3.50 3.09 4.55 3.67 3.08 4.00 2.75 2.38 2.65 3.25 3.58 2.89 4.05 
education 2.25 5.08 2.25 4.33 5.58 4.34 4.42 3.52 3.41 3.29 4.01 4.88 3.59 4.68 5.10 
finance 2.56 4.14 3.50 3.60 5.00 3.97 3.47 3.67 3.20 3.37 3.35 4.24 3.80 3.81 4.67 
housing 2.96 3.18 2.89 3.39 4.29 4.46 3.94 3.75 3.69 3.97 4.09 4.77 4.25 4.52 4.59 
back office 3.06 3.65 3.37 3.40 4.38 3.33 3.00 2.88 3.00 3.50 3.19 3.75 4.35 3.65 4.72 
planning 2.73 3.51 3.15 3.55 5.13 4.67 3.25 3.83 4.04 4.02 3.44 4.03 3.69 4.09 4.75 
protection 2.60 4.13 3.27 3.42 4.46 3.63 3.67 3.25 2.25 2.88 3.27 4.32 3.36 3.96 4.86 
regeneration 3.22 4.35 3.17 4.38 5.43 3.71 3.88 2.88 4.17 4.33 3.21 4.67 3.75 4.52 5.17 
adults 2.77 4.63 3.10 3.96 5.17 3.54 4.67 2.75 3.71 4.60 3.88 4.61 3.20 4.08 4.80 
children 2.95 4.91 3.30 4.23 5.07 3.42 4.83 3.25 3.67 4.33 3.62 5.01 3.01 3.66 4.85 
sport  2.32 2.86 4.36 3.82 3.64 3.38 3.56 4.38 3.44 4.09 3.55 3.70 4.00 4.20 4.73 
transport 3.14 3.42 3.72 3.64 4.78 4.00 3.55 4.35 3.45 4.13 3.67 4.15 3.79 4.10 4.08 
waste  2.50 3.36 3.14 3.86 5.79 3.25 3.50 3.88 2.88 2.69 3.50 4.75 2.88 4.44 4.96 
 
 
